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Abstract: This article explores the emergence of property as a moral convention. To understand this
process I make use of several laboratory experiments on property in its nascence. These experiments
illustrate how a rule of property arises from our knowledge of what is morally right, and not vice versa. I
also argue that while the ultimate end of property is our interest in using things, the proximate end of
property is not losing them, i.e., the end of a rule of property is to secure from morally unfounded harm.
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1
Non ex regula ius sumatur, sed ex iure quod est regula fiat.
What is right is not derived from the rule, but the rule arises from our knowledge of what is right.
– Julius Paulus, third century Roman jurist

1. Introduction
Departing from modern economic parlance, I have intentionally omitted the word rights
from the title and purposefully first deployed the adjectival form, right, in the epigraph.
Following the seminal work of Alchian (1965), Demsetz (1967), and Alchian and Demsetz
(1973)—the most prominent representatives of the neoclassical school of new institutional
economics, no economist is unclear as to the meaning of the term property rights. But the
distinction between property and property rights is less clear. Fisher (1906) defines a property
right as “the right to the chance of obtaining some or all of the future services of one or more
articles of wealth” and property as “the abstract right of ownership” (p. 22).1 He then plainly
differentiates these two definitions from the quotidian notion of a thing itself as “property”: “a
loaf of bread is concrete wealth, not a property right; the right to eat it is the property” (p. 23).
Alchian (1965) is more succinct on the meaning of property rights: “the rights of individuals to
the use of resources” (p. 53).
While economists broadly accept property rights as indispensable for understanding
economics, we define the nominal phrase circularly in terms of “the right to do X”.2 To channel
Blackstone, we seem to be afraid to put the question mark further down and ask what the right
to do X means, as if fearful of opening a Pandora’s box of morality; or at best we rest satisfied
treating the noun right as a universal semantic prime, self‐evident and incapable of being
further decomposed, indefinable except of itself.
2. Property is moral
But being fearful is a mistake and resting satisfied we are mistaken. Barzel (1997) avoids
the morality of rights by defining so‐called economic property rights as “the individual’s ability,
in expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of an asset) directly or to consume it
indirectly through exchange” (p. 3). The thug would agree as he whacks me on the head and
1

The earliest use of the term property right that I can find in Google Books is Lord Gardenston (1774: 14): “The
great argument, or ratio dubitandi, which I own at first almost convinced me, is, that the author has undoubtedly a
property‐right in the original manuscript composed by himself; why should he lose it by publication, as he intends
only to give the instruction or pleasure of reading, not the profit of publication or reprinting? I answer that,
certainly the author has a real property in the manuscript of his own work; but, in the nature of the thing, by
publication, gives his work to the public, and he gives the same species of property to every individual who buys
the book, which he had in the original copy before publication.”
2
Anderson and Huggins (2003) is a rare exception: “Property rights are the rules of the game that determine who
gets to do what and who must compensate whom if damages occur” (p. 2). I too will use the concept of rules and
rule‐following as the core of property emerging as a moral custom.
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takes the messenger bag from my shoulder. Exactly how is an ability to consume a right, or
property, or a property right?
The fear in broaching property as a moral concept is that when we look into the box of
morality, we are privy only to our own moral values and so we must settle for plumping for
what feels right to us. Moral reasoning, however, is as much objective as it is subjective. When
we find ourselves in a new situation with strangers we can search our personal databank of
experiences for common principles that might bring agreement. The twelve jurors who
unanimously convict my thief can agree in and on principle because morality is not purely
subjective.
On the mistaken second point, a right to do X is not a simple irreducible concept in
English, nor is its cognates in French (droit), German (Recht), or Italian (diritto). Meaning 9d in
the Oxford English Dictionary—the legal, equitable, or moral entitlement to do something,
reveals two conceptual units of a right to do X, the first of which is morality. Presuming that the
legal connotation historically follows and is derivative of the moral connotation (Salmond,
1907), it would be tempting and convenient in the modern era of legislature‐instituted rights to
subsume the moral sense within the legal sense. But as positively uncomfortable as it may be to
economists, morality is a critical component of understanding the emergence of property.3
The other key concept is entitlement, the grounds for laying a claim, not any claim, but a
moral claim to do X. This brings to the foreground the assertion of and an appeal to facts as
part of a justification for doing something. Wierzbicka (2006) argues that the word right as an
adjective has three senses (moral, intellectual, and conversational), which are all unique to
English. One common thread to each sense is that “human conduct can be seen and assessed
‘objectively,’ ‘rationally,’ and in accordance with ‘evidence.’ There are ‘rules’, there are
‘procedures,’ and there are objective criteria that people can refer to” (p. 79). As an
entitlement to do something, a subsidiary sense of empiricism similarly permeates the noun
right with appeals to rules and evidence to support a moral claim to do something.
While appeals to empirics almost always have a positive connotation in English,
empirique in French is rarely neutral and mostly negative (Wierzbicka 2010).4 So, we should not
be surprised that droit, the French word of import for the abstract noun right, does not evoke
evidentiary appeal and is conceptually decomposed in French differently. The online
3

Merrill and Smith (2007) argue that for property to work it must be recognized as moral, but they do not theorize
how property emerges.
4
One example of the latter, of several, that Wierzbicka gives is “l’astrologie est un rapport naïf et empirique au
cosmos (astrology is a naïve and empirical relationship with the cosmos)” (2010, p. 11). In contrast, in English an
empirical relationship is desirable and sound, “Efforts are being made to research it scientifically on the basis of
empirical evidence instead of philosophical logic and reasoning” (p. 12).
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Dictionnaire de l'Académie française defines droit, in the sense demanded, as ce qui est juste; ce
qui est conforme à une règle implicite ou édictée, i.e., that which is right (juste); that which is
consistent with an implicit or enacted rule. Again, droit carries both a moral and a legal sense,
but for our purposes the important semantic work to note is in the explicit evocation of
following a rule, an implicit rule, a moral rule. What is translated into English as the adjectival
right is the French word juste, which when one realizes that Latin in classical Roman times had
no letter j and instead used the letter i, indicates that we have made a full turn to the epigraph
and its keystone of ius.
3. Theoretical aim
One of the three classical Roman uses of ius is “a right, moral or legal,” as in the familiar
Justinian phrase ius suum cuique tribuere (Salmond 1907: 467).5 That is the meaning, albeit
notably not as a substantive, that Hayek (1973) situates in his translation of the Julius Paulus
maxim in the epigraph. In this article I will use that maxim to explicate a theory of the
emergence of property as a moral convention, and to understand the maxim I will make use of
several laboratory experiments on property. One element of my approach is Demsetzian. If
“the emergence of property rights can be understood best by their association with the
emergence of new or different beneficial and harmful effects” (Demsetz 1967: 350), such as a
case study of the Native American trade of beaver pelts on the Labrador peninsula, then the
novel circumstances of laboratory economies likewise present an opportunity to further that
theory by observing property in its nascence, with the additional benefit that these virtual
economic terraria are replicated several times over.
Given the unexamined use of the term property rights in economics, the tendency in
economics is to think out the question of what property is in terms of how property is known,
viz., the externally surmisable benefits and costs of using a resource. What Demsetz did not
have access to were the moral debates concerning such benefits and costs that the Labrador
Native Americans engaged in to establish new rules of property. In this article I mean to focus
on the actual deliberations of strangers interfacing in an unfamiliar context, out of which
emerges, or fails to emerge, a mutual delineation of Mine (meum) and Thine (tuum).
My theoretical framework is founded in rule‐guided action and rule‐guided perception,
which will, in turn, rely on morality. Following Hayek (1973), a rule “means simply a propensity
or disposition to act or not act in a certain manner, which will manifest itself in what we call a
practice or custom” (original emphasis, p. 75), with the practice or custom in question for this
article being what I will call property. Articulating the relationship between the rules of
property and the manifest practice of them is a crucial step that this paper takes, and as we
5

The two other uses of ius are (1) justice, from which iustitia and iustum are derived and (2) law, in the juridical
sense (p. 467).
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shall see, one that is impossible for neoclassical economics to take. What a theory of the
emergence of property needs is an approach that begins by treating property as a sphere of
actions, perceptions, and things that appears regularly in human intercourse. Thus I endeavor
to demarcate an uncontended core of the property of things (i.e., chattels) that gives the more
complex and contentious cases, such as externalities and land, the classic Blackacre or riparian
zones, whatever import they have.6
4. Rules, rule‐following, and custom
Our sense of what is right consists in the capacity to follow rules, rules that we do not
“know” in the sense that we can declare them all axiomatically, but “know” in the sense of
being able to describe roughly what actions are consistent, or not, with this or that rule (Hayek
1963). If this is not self‐evident, try listing all the rules of polite conversation. Have you
included what “do not bore” or “do not dominate” or “be responsive” means? These may not
even be first on your list of general rules of conversation, and yet when we are challenged with
someone who imperviously breaks one out of the uncountable myriad of rules, we can call
forth ex tempore the specific rule relevant for this encounter. We have a kind of a background
sense which, although quite unarticulable, allows us to formulate in the foreground a reason as
to why this person has attenuated the genial atmosphere.7
The first implication of not being able to explicitly know/specifically state the rules that
govern how we act is that only in their totality does a whole system of rules, the practice or
custom, form the sense of how to conduct ourselves rightly (Hayek 1952). To embed our
understanding of property in practices is to consider it as implicit in our rule‐guided actions,
and hence we are going well beyond the brute economistic weighing of benefits and costs. In
short, our actions are governed by abstract rules, not concrete algorithms of benefit‐cost
analysis. As sensitive as our actions are to the external benefits and costs of our circumstances,
much of our intelligent action arises from knowledge that is largely inarticulate. Moreover, the
assessments of benefits and costs that we do make are only intelligible against the background
provided by this inarticulate understanding. The practice provides the context within which the
assessment of benefits and costs makes the sense that it does. Benefits and costs are only
islands in the sea of property. Strategically important islands they may be, but islands
nonetheless.
The second implication is that the rules that govern our actions also govern our
perceptions of actions (Hayek 1963), and it is rule‐guided perception that poses the
6

One might also plausibly argue that property in chattels, which doesn’t accidentally sound like cattle, historically
well‐preceded property in land. Thus, the transfer of the domain of property from chattels to land and externalities
is a separate and open question.
7
Cf. Wittgenstein (1953: §422): “[T]here is a picture in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the background;
that is, the application of the picture is not easy to survey.”
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fundamental problem for the emergence of property as a moral convention. While different
individuals will recognize a specific set of circumstances as one of the same kind involving
property, we are unable to present the precise stimulus condition that will replicably produce
the same perception in different people and hence the same action in different people. Rule‐
guided perceptions carry the understanding in patterns of appropriate action, which conform to
a sense of what is right for this circumstance. But while agents can perceive when they or
others have or have not done what is right, that others share that perception is not foregone.
The perception of an action as one of kind that fits a pattern of what is right depends critically
on the agency being shared.
Actions constituted as a practice are shared among those who practice the practice
because the common perception of the action has integrated the individual agents into a
shared regularized whole, a “we”. Shared perceptions serve as the foundation for actions
within a practice, actions which are, what Bakhtin (1982) calls, dialogic, in continual active
dialogue and multilaterally extending to and from an agent. A rule doesn’t apply itself. It must
be followed in real time, under ever‐fluxional circumstances, and against the unarticulated
background of the entire practice. The interpretation of what a rule means is done on the fly
and in dialogic concert with those around the agent.
In contrast, framing property rights as the internalization of the benefits and costs of an
individual’s right to use a resource, in response to others, is monologic. Specifying a property
right as “W has the right to do X with Y,” doesn’t allow for the difference between the
formulation and its application in particular circumstances of time and place. It also doesn’t
take account of the bi‐directional relationship between a rule and the entire custom of
property. The custom is what keeps the rule active, and the application of the rule reaffirms the
custom. But the current application of the rule also modifies the custom by amalgamating into
the background all of the unarticulable nuances of its application here and now. Stating that
what is owned are rights to use resources is like Macbeth numbly concluding that life “is a tale /
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing.” Macbeth is engaging no one, and
no one him. He is simply responding to the news of Lady Macbeth’s death in a moment of
epiphany. Enter a Messenger.
5. Ex iure quod est regula fiat
In the external relations of free Roman men Mackeldey (1883) explains one meaning of
ius as ius est norma agendi, which he translates as ius “is a rule of conduct” (p. 1).8 Literally
translated, ius is the standard which is to be acted.9 From everyday human intercourse we
8

Another is ius est facultas agendi, the license to act.
Curiously, agendi, translated as the future passive participle of the verb to act (agere), is considered to be the
marking of the jussive mood.

9
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have expectations of the regularity of each other’s conduct. The moral ius is the background
practice of what is right, out of (ex) which arises the rule (regula). When does a rule arise?
When one needs to be formulated. When does a rule need to be formulated? When
disagreement in the perceptions of what is right leads to an act contrary to the ius, an iniuria.
Such an act challenges the existing multilateral dialogue of actions. It interrupts the regularity
of everyone’s conduct. The rule now in the foreground as remonstrance relies on the
unarticulable background of the entire practice. Returning to the example of conversation, the
rule “do not bore” is called to the foreground when we are confronted with a veritable bore in
the room, and what it means to bore us to tears (say, with the semantics of Latin phrases) relies
on all the unarticulable rules of polite conversation.
Finally, we consider the negative portion of Julius Paulus’ maxim: Non ex regula ius
sumatur. The reason then why the ius, literally translated, is not taken out of the rule, is
because the unarticulable background cannot be taken out of an articulated foreground. The
everyday practice of what is right is not derived from a rule, not only because the custom is
unarticulable in toto, but also because a rule not summoned from custom cannot anticipate the
unknowable local circumstances under which it might conflict with another rule subsumed
within the practice of what is right.
We are now in the position to apply rather straightforwardly Julius Paulus’ maxim to the
case of property: A rule of property regarding things arises from our background knowledge of
what is right regarding things. To explicate this proposition I will draw from the spontaneous
conversations of participants in the laboratory experiments reported in Kimbrough, Smith, and
Wilson (2010), Kimbrough (2011), Wilson et al. (2012), and Jaworski and Wilson (2013).
6. Platform 1: The homestead
Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) is the first experiment to explore how property
emerges as a convention in the laboratory. The basis for the heuristic experiment is a platform
designed by Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) who explore how a market might emerge
endogenously when participants have to discover (a) that trade is possible and that once
discovered, (b) specialization is then possible to exploit the wealth‐creating benefits of trade.
Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) took the institution of property for granted and built the
platform accordingly: What one could produce and what one could consume, no one could
interrupt. The simple change that Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) make to the platform is
to relax that assumption built into the software.
Figure 1 displays a screenshot of the Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) experiment.
Every session consists of eight participants who each control the production of two types of
fictitious goods, red and blue. In Figure 1, Person 2 controls the production displayed in the
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rectangle numbered 2 (and in green only on Person 2’s screen), which is called a field. All
participants are informed in the instructions, deliberately in the passive voice, that:
When the clock expires [at the end of the period], you earn cash based upon the number of red
and blue items that have been moved to your house. To select items to be moved, left click on
an item or click on the red or blue buttons at the top of the screen. The yellow highlighted items
can be moved by dragging with the right mouse button.

Person 2’s house is in green (on Person 2’s screen). What the participants are not told is that
they can move items to other people’s houses and fields [as was only the case in Crockett,
Smith, and Wilson (2009)] and that they can move items from other people’s houses and fields.
The participants must discover that such movements of items are possible.
The participants are also not informed, but can discover, that the odds (evens) are
capable of increasing returns for producing red (blue):
For the first 10 seconds of each period, you will produce items in your green field. Using the
scroll bar in the upper middle portion of your screen, you can change the proportion of each
second allocated to producing red and blue. Each person’s production is displayed on their field.

An odd (even) can earn 30 (26) cents in autarky, but with specialization and exchange at the
competitive price, an odd‐even pair can earn 90 and 80 cents, respectively. Anytime an item is
moved to another person, the movement is recorded in a chat room in the middle of the
screen, and anytime an item is moved from another person, the movement is recorded in red.
Key for this article, at any time during the session, the participants are free to chat with the
other participants in one of the two publicly accessible chat rooms. The instructions for the
chat room give the participants wide latitude within an explicit constraint of civility:
Everyone in this experiment can send text messages. Everyone can read all posted messages. In
the center of the screen, you can type a message in the line in either of two chat rooms and click
on the Send button.
Under your house you can also post a one‐line message that will be visible at all times to the
other players.
You are free to discuss all aspects of the experiment, with the following exceptions: you may not
reveal your name, discuss side payments [outside of the laboratory], make threats, or engage in
inappropriate language (including such shorthand as ‘WTF’). If you do, you will be excused and
you will forfeit your earnings.

Unlike the well‐circumscribed action spaces in traditional economic experiments, this
one is as wide open as the Wild West. Participants interact in real time from the moment the
experiment begins until it concludes 67 minutes later. The software imposes no order of
moves, except that red and blue are produced during the first 10 seconds of a period and that
consumption occurs at the moment the period concludes 90 seconds later. In Kimbrough,
Smith, and Wilson (2010) and Jaworski and Wilson (2013) the participants start in pairs, and
without hint or notice, two pairs appear as one group of four on the screen, and finally the two
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groups of four become one group of eight, but in Kimbrough (2011) all eight people are
together for the entire session (which actually makes things more unsettling). The participants
inhabit a hurly‐burly uncertain world. The experience is fast‐paced, you might even say
suspenseful, to such an extent that after a pilot session, we made every 7th period a day of rest
in which nothing is produced but during which the participants can still converse with each
other.
At this point the naysayer interjects to make the original observation that the
participants live a physical world with secure property and that we gave the participants their
own house and field in the virtual world. So what can this experiment help us understand
about the emergence of property as a moral convention? My riposte is that obviously my co‐
authors and I are not claiming to have recreated the Big Bang of property. That would be cool
but a little dangerous. Instead we are observing how real people making decisions of salient
monetary consequence interface with each other on a frontier with no externally‐enforced
custom of property. Some groups will succeed and prosper, and some will fail and spectacularly
so. The question is, can we identify why from a complete historical record of what happened,
including their heat‐of‐the‐moment conversations? New experiments can also be designed to
test any ex post synthesis.10 If a nagging intuition questions whether endowing the participants
with their exclusive control over a field and house is important to these observations from the
laboratory, then let’s bring that to the foreground.
7. Platform 2: The open sea
Ellickson (1989) studies how North Atlantic whalers in the 18th and 19th centuries solved
the problem of property for things that lie free for any taker (res in medio quibusvis exposita).
Wilson et al. (2012) test Ellickson’s admittedly ex post explanation with an ex ante experimental
design.11 Figure 2 displays the software interface for the experiment.
Each participant, first in pairs and then later without notice as a sextet, control a stick
figure which can move around the white open area in the middle the screen. The range of
vision for a stick figure is limited to the gray area displayed in Figure 2 for Orange. White circles
move randomly around the wide Sargasso Sea until a stick figure right clicks on one within its
range. Five seconds later the computer determines according to an unannounced probability
whether the stick figure is successful in hauling in the circle. Within that five seconds, however,
any other stick figure within range or capable of reaching the circle, can also “throw a line” and
attach itself to the circle. Each whole circle is redeemable for v = 60 or 100¢, depending upon
10

Kimbrough, Smith, and Wilson (2010) do just that in three successive treatments.
The resources in DeScioli and Wilson (2011) also lie free for any taker, but the participants are unable to discuss
the situation. Their avatars can only inflict damage, benignly smile, or extricate themselves from the showdown in
which two participants wish to consume the same resource.

11
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treatment. However, if multiple people are probabilistically successful, each successful
participant only receives a 1/n2‐portion of the whole circle. Thus, (1 – 1/n)v of value is wasted
if multiple people lay claim to the same circle the lies free for any taker. After 90 seconds for
“gathering”/“catching” circles, the stick figures figuratively return to port for 60 or 90 seconds,
depending upon treatment, and are free to discuss anything in the experiment within the same
guidelines reported above.
To test Ellickson’s proposition that different circumstantial conditions lead to different
rules of capture, the stick figures could use two different lines to gather circles, or as it is
explained in the instructions:
On the top right side, you will see the number of lines that you have left. There are two types of
lines, regular and colored which can be selected by using the appropriate radio button next to
them. Both lines work in the same way with one exception. If you hit a circle with a colored line,
the circle will turn your color whether or not the computer determines you are successful in
catching it.

Later, the instructions inform them that:
You may also purchase additional lines by clicking on the BUY button next to the type of line you
would like to purchase. The cost of the lines is taken out of your earnings. You will be given an
initial allotment of lines. After that you will be able to purchase colored lines for 12¢ [or 20¢
depending on treatment] and regular lines for 6¢ [10¢].

With regular lines, the participants can implement the whaling rule which was called fast‐fish,
loose‐fish. If a ship’s harpoon was in the whale and held fast to the boat, no one else would
attempt to catch that whale. However, if the harpoon was not attached to the boat, that is, the
fish was loose, then the whale was fair game for any other ship to harpoon. Ellickson notes that
whalers in the North Atlantic used this rule for preying upon right whales, a slow‐moving baleen
whale that doesn’t dive when harpooned and isn’t particularly feisty.
When whaling moved off the coast of the U.S., American whalers preyed upon sperm
whales, which have teeth, will use them on a boat, and will dive pulling the boat down with
them. With this change in conditions, Ellickson reports that American whalers switched from a
fast‐fish, loose‐fish rule to what was called iron holds the whale. If a ship’s harpoon is attached
to whale and identifiable so, then no other ship would attempt to catch the whale. The colored
lines allow the participants to identify the first striker. The reason why they are more expensive
in the experiment is so that the participants can reveal‐prefer a colored line to a regular line.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments. In the first the circles move
slowly are easy to catch on the first strike with p = .75. In the second, the whales move 50%
faster and were three times more difficult to catch on the first strike (q = .25). In a subsequent
third treatment, the participants first experienced right‐like whales for the first two‐thirds of
the session and then unannounced the same‐looking circle began behaving like a sperm whale.

10

8. What is ‘What is right’?
Despite the functional differences in the platforms, common themes run through the
discussions of both types of experiments and the emergence of property follows the same
process in both platforms. The undergraduate students only participated in one session within
a platform and only a small number of the 480 participants would have been recruited to
participate in both platforms. As the excerpts of the instructions above hint, the instructions
are deliberately sparse. We beam the strangers onto an unfamiliar virtual world, like Jean‐Luc
Picard and the metaphor‐phonic Dathon, and ask them to make sense of each other in
whatever comes next. The question is whether and how they make it work.12
Not surprisingly, at the beginning of the session or when additional stick figures or
houses and fields suddenly appear around them, the participants use the chat room to get their
bearings. The screen is a picture in the foreground, but what is the sense that lies in the
background? What subsidiary perception fits the application of the representation in focus?
The chat transcripts provide a glimpse into the sense they are attempting to make.13 Here are
some examples of the first steps of that process (the dashed lines demarcate distinct sessions):
D: should we be trying to help each other?
D: or is selfishness the way to go?
H: that’s a super good plan …
H: if everyone just agrees to not steal other peoples then we will get more
A: that is very true
D: I think so too
G: true
D: I'm down
H: so just do that
G: so r we working together or against each other
H: i think we are supposed to work together
G: ok sounds fine
B: its a way to collaborate and help each other or steal from each other
Notice first that while the instructions on actions are amoral, and in the first platform
presented in the passive voice, the participants readily imbue the observed actions with
morality, calling certain movements of pixelated chits and certain clicks on a circle “stealing”.
12

“Like Darmok and Jalad at Tanagra”.
Because the participants are identified as Person i in the first platform and by a color name in the second, to
standardize the presentation of the conversations, I will use letters to denote the different participants within a
session. Sometimes the context will incidentally reveal which platform the session comes from, and other times
not. The latter case is intentional. Each panel is from a distinct session. Several but not all of the conversations are
presented in the original papers which also include many more details on the context of the specific session.
13
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This isn’t a rare occurrence. According to the 450 million word Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA), the frequency of the word steal is 20,296 (#1,798 on the list and right
below politician).14 The four experiments discussed in this article include a total of 480
participants in 60 sessions who typed 175,143 words (space delimited units of text). The words
steal, stealing, steals, stole, and stolen appear correctly spelled 397 times. That is 50.3 times
the frequency in the COCA.15 –But of course they call this “stealing”. They come from a physical
universe with formally and informally enforced property.– The question to ask, if you are not
peering into the mists of time, is: Why is it that the perceptions of these participants lead them
to apply that word with its full moral force to these particular circumstances?
Note also how B, D, and G perceptionally parse the context into one of two big bins.
Either we help each other, work together, and collaborate or we selfishly work against each
other and steal from one another. D and G are in part seeking clarification on what is right in
this virtual world, but why pose the question? They are re‐cognizing the background and have a
subsidiary interest in the first perceptual bin, which is the first alternative in each of the three
cases. Not once do I recall the question in the transcripts being posed in the form of, “Should
we be trying to be selfish or is helping each other the way to go?” D and G are also raising the
question as the foundation for seeking agreement on the former of the two possible answers.
The problem then becomes one of integration into a “we”:
E: do you want to do this the right way?
F: wht is the right way
E: the right way is I produce red you make blue then we split it nobody gets 100
percent profit but we both win
F: tht wat i been doing then u started stealing
F: [E] do u wanna start talkin about maximizing our production or keep fighting
over it?
Integrating into a regularized whole involves changing the moral view of those that do
not perceptually share the same background of what is right. Observed contradictions are one
hurdle. F claims that E’s harmonizing plan is inconsistent with his or her prior actions. Another
hurdle is virtual vertigo. The declaration of “im confused” is not uncommon in this type of
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http://www.wordfrequency.info/
In stark contrast, Buchanan and Wilson (2013) find only one instance of anyone objecting to the “re‐selling” of a
non‐rivalrous good produced by another person, and the words steal, stealing, steals, stole, and stolen were never
once used in 5,183 words of a treatment with no enforcement of property.
15
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experiment following digitization into the e‐world. In platform 1, the transition is achieved by
clarifying, as E does, how to specialize and trade.16 But there is also moral confusion:
D: So it would benefit us all if no one was a thief. [A]!
A: the point..is to make a big profit?
D: yes but to make a long term profit teamwork helps a lot
Participants volunteer for these experiments to earn cold hard cash. Profit is the common goal.
To achieve that goal as an integrated group, D reasons with A by liberating from moral disregard
a principle which A cannot contest. Once teamwork is perceptually shared, the transition to a
whole can follow quickly:
F: lets agree to not hit once someone is on it alot of money is lost
D: hahah
A: true
F: my partner and i did and it worked well
E: yup
F: agreed??
A: agreed
F: [D]??
F: [C]??
A: lol
E: haha
A: guess not
C: yea that sounds like a plan
However, with the intransigent, integration is not inevitable:
D: look, if we all stop stealing, we can all help each other maximize
…
A: yea [B] push it
D: but... we can help you
B: no
D: what do you need?
D: how many blue for red?
D: we can give you what you need, without you hurting us
C: [B] everyone else hit it were trying to help each other
A: no one can get screwed if we don't steal
C: you aren't making ANY money now
…
D: and we have all been helping each other the whole time
16

Crockett, Smith, and Wilson (2009) observe that roughly half of the pairs never discover exchange (and hence
specialization). Groups of four always discover exchange and early on.

13

B: Chill out.. itis just a game
…
D: so we are reputalbe
C: uh
C: for MONEYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY
C: real money
C: why are you even here
D: we can help you earn more
C: [B] is BALLIN
D: if you let us
D: and then, you would stop hurting us
…
C: we are working together
C: but [B] doesnt want to help
…
C: [B] why would you steal my red fopr someone else17
B: just because
…
B: Stop whining
D: gaah! when will it end!
C: your taking MY MONEY
C: real money
This is one of the rare cases of an obdurate “baller” chatting with, or better,
antagonizing everyone else. Individuals who have not attuned themselves to the group are
generally quiet to the point of ignoring pleas to engage in conversation.18 A, C, and D have
integrated into a regularized “we” who are “working together” and “helping each other” (these
are common phrases across sessions), but B clearly has not. B is interrupting the dialogue of A,
C, and D and challenging the integration of the We, which the We remonstrates as “hurting
us”.19
Up to until this point, I have described this situation somewhat disinterestedly as one of
disagreement in the perceptions of what is right, out of which a rule of property arises. Can
either B’s propensity to act in a certain manner or the We’s disposition not to act manifest itself

17

Moving the items to an unsuspecting location is a commonly employed strategy when possession is particularly
unstable.
18
They also tend to avert their eyes when they are privately paid their earnings at the conclusion of the session.
19
See Kimbrough and Wilson (2013) for an experiment that uses geography as a treatment condition to induce the
solidaristic tribal instinct of “us versus them.” They then subject the world to an unforeseeable productivity shock
to ask whether the rules of property can adapt to outsiders. Smith, Skarbek, and Wilson (2012) also find that such
tribal sentiments feed wasteful investment in capabilities to plunder and to defend against predation.
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in a custom? The reflexive answer is, well no, both are not possible if the telos of a rule is to
regularize activity and create an order,20 as the participants are well aware:
G: teamwork evryone wins
H: right right right
...
G: in this exp. the access to other peoples stuff really just causes problems
...
H: lets make some money
G: muah ha ha ha. order fights chaos i love it!!!!
E: hahahaha
G: no taking. ask and you shall recieve
...
G: the only chaos is if the other half doesn't play nicely
E: seriously people your going to mess it up for everyone because this will turn
into everyone messing eachothers up
E: and noone winning
But why will this mess it up for everyone is a good question, and relevant to answering the
bigger question of how do moral sentiments undergird the rule of property that emerges.
9. Harm, resentment, and property
Consider Baller B and the We of A, C, and D. The We perceive certain clicks of B’s mouse
as stealing that screws them over and hurts them. If they leave the experimental session with
zero earnings, they still receive $7 for showing up on time, which is more than they walked into
the laboratory with. So what makes B’s clicks hurtful to the We? A, C, and D perceive
themselves to be falling from a superior to an inferior position, the superior position being that
each person is the only person who controls how much red and blue are produced in one
specific field. For each person there is also only one house that will convert red and blue items
at the end of the period into cash earnings, provided items have been moved to it. The inferior
position obviously is no red and blue items in either a field or house following B’s clicks and
hence no cash earnings. Adam Smith summarizes the situation to a tee when placed in the
context of this session (1759: 82‐3):
To disturb [the We’s] happiness merely because it stands in the way of [B’s] own, to take from [A,
C, and D] what is of real use to [A, C, and D] merely because it may be equal or of more use to
[B], or to indulge, in this manner, at the expence of other people, the natural preference which
every man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial spectator
can go along with…

20

The Latin word regula is the common root for both rule and regular.
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Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally prefers
himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts
according to this principle, and that how natural soever it may be to him, it must always appear
excessive and extravagant to them…
[B] is to them, in every respect, as good as [A, C, and D]: they do not enter into that self‐love by
which [B] prefers himself so much to [the We], and cannot go along with the motive from which
he hurt[s] [A, C, and D].

Part of the background of what is right, as Smith details above, is that “there can be no proper
motive for hurting our neighbour” (Smith 1759: 82).21 B’s clicking on the red and blue items in
the fields and houses not under his control is an act contrary to the ius, an iniuria, not just in
the secondary sense of harm in the modern use of the word injury, but also in the primary
moral sense of an act contrary to what is right. With the hope of bringing him into the group,
the We are showing up B in the dialogue to be callous and morally perverse so that a rule of
property may emerge. In Platform 1 (the homestead), the form of the rule seems rather
straightforward. In one lone case, someone spells it out precisely as a rule:
E: but let’s start with the rule of: don’t take stuff from other people’s houses or
fields
While this rule may appear obvious, it is not the only possible rule of property for
Platform 1. When followed in real time and under fluctuating circumstances, a different rule
may arise out of a minor change in the background. Recall that the design in Kimbrough (2011)
slightly differs from the others in that all eight participants are together from the beginning of
the session. Because the harmony of possession is more difficult to achieve from the outset in
octets than in duets, every single one of Kimbrough (2011) sessions discusses a different rule
never proposed elsewhere in Platform 1, namely:
E: the fields are fairgame, lets decide on that from now on, nobody takes
ANYTHING from a house, if you have stuff to share you can put it in your field
The same process is at work in Platform 2. When a stick figure is the first to click on
freely roaming white circle, the first striker suffers harm (probabilistically) when anyone else
subsequently clicks on the same circle. As “things”, these pixels on a computer screen are
within the virtual grasp of the whalers and homesteaders before a Baller B snatches them away.
This perception of harm is the common thread across these two different platforms and why
double clicking a circle is considered just as much to be stealing as moving red and blue items
out of a creator‐endowed field or house. In both platforms, the different participants perceive
the actions of the Baller B‐types as one of the same bad kind. Just as the We resent B, so
21

Notice also that part of the ius is that every person in every respect is as good as another in this experiment. The
closer we look, the more rules we see come out of the background to support the ones we are focally attending to.
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integrated groups of stick figures in Platform 2 also resent the iniuria of double clicking on
circles, which can prompt them to retaliate:
B: [D] you took mine! haha
F: what ever happen to our deal??
D: hhahah im the best
D: im the master
C: i know right
A: [D] u suck\
D: i leraned the best from [C]
F: ok everybody only steal from [D]
C: LOL
A: k
B: haha
D: hahah hey no fair
E: deal
F: deal
C: deal
E: haha
F: blue??
F: dude come on
A: sorry..
E: hahahaha
F: or dudet u in??
F: steal from [D] no one else
F: ??
A: i will
E: me 2
F: sweet
Regardless of the form of the rule that arises out of the background to fit the local
circumstances, there is a compelling emotion, which Adam Smith astutely identifies, that
buttresses the sentiments regarding a rule of property as moral: “Resentment seems to have
been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only...It prompts us to beat of mischief
which is attempted to be done to us, and to retaliate that which is already done” (Smith 1759:
79). In a two‐page long footnote, Smith anticipates and refutes a reluctance to accept
resentment as part of a sense of moral demerit (p. 76):
Resentment is commonly regarded as so odious a passion, that they will be apt to think it is
impossible that so laudable a principle, as the sense of the ill desert of vice, should in any respect
be found upon it. They will be more willing, perhaps, to admit that our sense of the merit of good
actions is founded upon a sympathy with the gratitude of the persons who receive the benefit of
them; because gratitude…is regarded as an amiable principle, which can take nothing from the
worth of whatever is founded upon it. Gratitude and resentment, however, are in every respect,
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it is evident, counterparts to one another; and if our sense of merit arises from a sympathy with
the one, our sense of demerit can scarce miss to proceed from a fellow‐feeling with the other.22

Within the integrated community, everyone empathizes with everyone else in their resentment
of the harm inflicted by people like D, the self‐proclaimed master. This empathy is a necessary
component for supporting a rule of property, and what makes this empathy palpable is that the
individuals have harmonized into a We. Resentment is the emotion, the predisposition, that
makes the rule of property a moral goal. The rule of property is moral, not merely because the
community is in fact committed to the rule, but because the community feels compelled through
resentment to commit to the rule. When E says above that “seriously people your going to mess
it up for everyone because this will turn into everyone messing eachothers up,” E is concerned
that the commitment to the rule might erode. That it often doesn’t in the presence of an
incorrigible is a testament to the work that morality does.23 Resentment of harm, the mutual
empathy of desiring to avoid harm, and the compelling moral commitment to a rule to avoid
harm are what give meaning to property as a practice.
10. HAVE versus POSSESS
Rose (1985) argues that possession is the origin of property. Unlike the concept of a
RIGHT or POSSESS, HAVE is a universal semantic prime, an innate concept; it is not further
decomposable into simpler semantic units and every language appears to have a word for HAVE
(Goddard and Wierzbicka 2002).24 As we easily intuit, to possess is to have, but to have is not
to possess. Smith (1894) discriminates the two words in English, and so strikingly so for my
purposes that I beg pardon for the extended quotation (p. 622; font effects modified to
conform with this article):
Have is a simpler and wider term than possess, possession being a mode of having. Generally it
may be said that one has what is part of or closely connected with one’s self. One possesses what
is external to one’s self, but appropriated for certain purposes. I have or I possess an estate; but I
have, not I possess, a bad cold. When possess is used of what is internal to one’s self the thing is
regarded externally; that is, in reference to its use and purpose, rather than the subject in which
it resides. Thus a man has legs by virtue of his human organization. He possesses legs, as being an
animal gifted with that particular means of locomotion. So, in reference, not to what a man is,
but what he does, or is capable of doing, we say, that he possesses reason and certain mental
faculties or powers. To have generally expresses a transitory, or to possess a more permanent,
power or control…A man is said to have money, which is, however, always changing and
circulating, and to possess a house, lands, and the like. We are masters of what we possess, not
always so of what we have.

22

Samuel Johnson’s dictionary (http://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/) from 1755 defines sympathy as fellow‐
feeling; mutual sensibility; and the quality of being affected by the affection of another. Our word empathy, which
wasn’t available to Smith, fits better than sympathy for the modern reader not familiar with 18th century diction.
23
F’s plan to only “steal” from the master of mischief D and no one else actually worked. Why? Because everyone
else held to their moral convictions.
24
Concepts are denoted by small caps, words by italics.
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While the universality of HAVE makes have a more appealing cornerstone than possess
for a theory of the emergence of property, the distinction of the two more importantly situates
Rose’s project within mine. As Smith (1894) articulates, possess connotes an external
orientation that have does not, and the discussion in Rose (1985) exudes that external
orientation to the world. Acts of possession serve as a “statement”, and in an illuminating
analogy, “texts” are to be “‘read’ by the relevant audience at the appropriate time” (pp. 77 and
82‐83). Why must the act to possess be taken? To express a more permanent power or
control to the external world, because simply having can be transitory. It is curious that possess
nominalizes more flexibly than have. To possess Y can lead to a condition of Y being a
possession, but to have Y is more mutable and is only nominalizable by the gerund. It makes
sense to say that Until there is an act to possess Y, there is no possession of Y. But compare that
with *Until there is an act to have Y, there is no having of Y. Neither clause sounds right, and at
best it’s a tautology. What this means is that acts to possess are rules of property that have
come to the foreground for particular circumstances. What Rose (1985) considers to be the
origination of property is the formalization of these rules in common law.
This article drills down to the universal and simpler bedrock level of HAVE. At any
moment in time, my participants have red and blue items, but when the items are continually
circulating, they do not possess them. Once they have established a rule, say that “the fields
are fairgame [and] nobody takes ANYTHING from a house”, then moving items from someone
else’s field into your own house becomes an act to possess. According to the Oxford English
Dictionary, have is descended “from a primitive sense to hold (in hand)”. Because we resent
the harm when things are ripped from our hands, when we are not masters of what we have,
we seek to become masters of what we possess through a rule of property. Mutual empathy
towards harm converts islands of individuals who have into individual members of a We who
possess. Once we have a rule, the moral commitment to the rule sustains the rule as part of the
manifest practice or tradition of property.
11. Pierson v. Post
Sometime between 1800 and 1803, there was an incident on a Long Island beach
between Lodowick Post and Jesse Pierson regarding a fox (Berger 2006). Two hundred years
later, two undergraduates uncannily recreated the scene in a laboratory experiment involving a
circle. Their verbal exchange went like this:
Post: omg [Pierson]
Post: u saw i had that one
...

Post: [Pierson]
...

Post: that was mine
...
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Pierson: u lost it so i have to get it
Post was pursuing a fox just like his 21st century counterpart was pursuing his green circle
(though without the support of any digital hounds) when Pierson, knowing that Post was in
pursuit but without a shot, interloped and killed the fox/captured the circle. Post resented the
outcome and sued Pierson. The justice of the peace ruled for Post, but Pierson so resented
losing the case that he appealed to the New York Supreme Court. Their decision is one that
every first year law student of property learns.25
The court had to decide what the rule of property is for ferae naturae that lie free for
any taker with a good line of sight. Post considered the rule to be identifiable hot pursuit and
Pierson the first to have the varmint in hand.26 The participants in Platform 2 similarly have to
settle on a rule of capture. They, however, had no recourse to courts to decide for them
following a dispute. Wilson et al. (2012) find that if civil‐minded participants settle on a rule,
they readily adopt fast‐fish, loose‐fish rule with slow, easy‐to‐catch right whales (so‐named
because they are the right whale to hunt). We, however, do not replicably observe iron holds
the whale, even when the prey switched from right to sperm whales within a session. Mixing
one’s labor with pursuit, plus, in the case of the experiment, sinking the cost of a colored line do
not have the same regularizing effect. Why might that be? Adam Smith explains that “[t]o be
deprived of that which we are possessed of, is a greater evil than to be disappointed of what
we have only the expectation” (1759: 84). The difference is that having a circle in hand creates
positive harm when it is ripped from the hand, and the disappointment of expectations is just
that, a disappointment. The former is emotionally hotter and hence easier to mutually
empathize with when agreeing to a rule.
That’s not to say that Post cannot get emotionally hot with disappointed expectations.
The rumor is that the parties each spent £1,000 in 1805 on lawyer fees (Fernandez, 2006).27
When the new circumstances of time and place bring to the foreground a conflict in
expectations, “[t]he task of rules of [property] can only thus be to tell people which
expectations they can count on and which not” going forward (Hayek 1973: 102). The court
decided that having the fox in hand is an act to possess and prevents more confusion. I would
add that the clarity of the rule coincides with and is supported by a stronger emotional
response, for once the prey is in hand it becomes more closely connected with one’s self.

25

Pierson v. Post. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
Foxes were pests in the early 19th century and not the graceful creatures they are today.
27
I thank Ron Rotunda for the reference.
26
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12. A negative theory of property: Ius, not use
A distinguishing feature of this step further towards a theory of the emergence of
property is its negative character. Nominalizing the problem of property as a right to do X with Y
diverts our attention from the rule‐guided actions and perceptions of people involving things.
As Wittgenstein (1958) recognized, “a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to
it” (p. 1). Rather than focusing on what people do and feel for property to emerge as a custom,
we look for the distinguishing features that define this noun, but a right does not have well‐
defined boundaries like a chair does. So to aid us with the conceptualization, in the late 19th
century British lawyers began employing a metaphor, property as a bundle of rights, which still
persists, though not without its vocal critics.28 Treating rights bundleable like sticks only more
deeply reinforces the notion that rights are things, but because rights aren’t things, equally
amorphous substantives, such as duties, privileges, powers, and immunities, are called upon to
explicate the intricacies of property (see, e.g., Hohfeld 1919). With all this focus on things, the
purpose for property becomes the use of the things (Penner 1997).29
As difficult as it may be for economists to read without falling out of their chairs, the
purpose of property, the custom, is not the use of things. The end of a rule of property is to
secure from iniuria. That is the sense in which property is negative. The use of things is the
ultimate purpose of having things, but a rule of property to possess things does not arise from
the use of things.30 If things were not scarce and people not mischievous, selfish, and limited in
generosity, we would not need rules of property regarding things (Hume 1740). Rather, a rule
of property arises out of our background knowledge of what is right, which includes protecting
from real and positive hurt. As Hume (1740) observed, a rule property “acquires force by a slow
progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it”
(3.2.2.10). We have rules of property, not because we have an ultimate interest in using things
28

Banner (2011) traces its first uses to George Sweet in 1873, with respect to proprietorship, and to Robert
Campbell in 1881, with respect to property. See Symposium (2011) for a debate on the merits of the metaphor.
29
Smith (2012) lays bare the bundle‐of‐rights metaphor as a tenable theory of property. See also references
therein for more of his articles on this topic. He, like Schmidtz (2012), takes the right to exclude as a core principle
of property. To it, Smith (2012) adds the information costs of governing that right to complete his modular theory
of property. While the right to exclude is indeed a core principle of the practice of property, it is not the right place
to look to understand the emergence of property, for it is difficult to see how the right to exclude becomes moral.
What is the emotion, the passion, that compels commitment to a right to exclude that is distinct from and prior to
resentment as a defense against loss? A right to exclude is part of the practice of property but not proximate to
the emergence of property. When unaligned expectations lead to a conflict, the open question is whether the
conflict should be settled with a positive statement of a right to exclude or a negative statement of either (a) what
harm did not occur or (b) what should not have been done to cause harm.
30
Smith (2012) similarly concludes that “[r]ights to exclude are a means to an end, and the ends in property relate
to people’s interest in using things” (p. 1704). Claeys (2012) credits Smith (2012) for that conclusion but critiques
his theory for failing to explain “how, why, or to what extent exclusion and governance each institute or embody
the moral norms internal to property in practice” (p. 143). This article takes the step of incorporating the morality
of harm into the emergence of property regarding things.
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within our grasp, but because, proximately, someone with an equal or stronger hand may
challenge our grasp.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank Jeffrey Kirchner, without whose creative software programming this research
program would not have been possible, and Joshua Rains for his capable research assistance.
Sarah Skwire provided key leads for thinking about this paper, for which I dearly thank her. I
also thank PERC for their generous hospitality and financial support as a Lone Mountain Fellow
during the summer of 2013, and I gratefully acknowledge financial assistance from the NSF (SES
1123803). Comments from Dan Benjamin, Eric Claeys, Kyle Hampton, Erik Kimbrough, David
Rojo‐Arjona, Ron Rotunda, Sarah Skwire, Taylor Jaworski, Vernon Smith, and seminar
participants at PERC have improved the arguments and exposition of the article. Lastly, I am
indebted to my co‐authors for many stimulating and fun conversations on a topic that normal
people would consider rather dull.
References
Alchian, Armen. 1965. “Some Economics of Property Rights,” Il Politico 30: 816–829. Reprinted
in The Collected Works of Armen A. Alchian: Volume 2: Property Rights and Economic
Behavior, Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2006.
Alchian, Armen and Demsetz, Harold. 1973. “The Property Rights Paradigm,” Journal of
Economic History 33: 16‐27.
Anderson, Terry L. and Laura E. Huggins. 2003. Property Rights: A Practical Guide to Freedom &
Prosperity. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.
Bakhtin, Mikhail M. 1982. The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Edited by M. Holquist and
translated by M. Holquist and C. Emerson. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Barzel, Yoram. 1997. Economic Analysis of Property Rights. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Banner, Stuart. 2011. American Property: A History of How, Why, and What We Own.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Berger, Bethany. 2006. “It's Not About the Fox: The Untold History of Pierson v. Post,” Duke Law
Journal 55(6): 1089‐1143.
Buchanan, Joy A. and Bart J. Wilson. 2013. “An Experiment on Protecting Intellectual Property,”
Economic Science Institute Working Paper, Chapman University.
Claeys, Eric R. 2012. “Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of
Things,” Harvard Law Review Forum 125: 133‐150.

22

Crockett, Sean, Vernon L. Smith, and Bart J. Wilson. 2009. “Exchange and Specialisation as a
Discovery Process,” Economic Journal 119: 1162‐1188.
Demsetz, Harold. 1967. “Toward a Theory of Property Rights,” American Economic Review
(Papers & Proceedings) 57:347–59.
DeScioli, Peter and Bart J. Wilson. 2011. “The Territorial Foundations of Human Property,”
Evolution and Human Behavior 32: 297‐304.
Ellickson, Robert C. 1989. ‘‘A Hypothesis of Wealth‐Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the
Whaling Industry,’’ Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 5: 83‐97.
Fernandez, Angela. 2009. “The Lost Record of ‘Pierson v. Post,’ the Famous Fox Case,” Law and
History Review 27(1): 149‐178.
Fisher, Irving. 1906. The Nature of Capital and Income. New York: The Macmillan Company.
Gardenston(e), Lord. 1774. “Lords Opinions Concerning Literary Property,” The Scots Magazine
36: 14‐17.
Goddard, Cliff and Anna Wierzbicka. 2002. Meaning and Universal Grammar: Theory and
Empirical Findings (Vols. 1 and 2). Philadelphia: John Benjamins.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1952. The Sensory Order: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical
Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1973. Law, Legislation, and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Hayek, Friedrich A. 1963. “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility,” Proceedings of the British
Academy 48: 321‐344.
Hohfeld, Wesley N. 1919. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning and
Other Legal Essays. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Hume, David. 1740. A Treatise of Human Nature. Edited by D. Norton and M. Norton. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2000.
Jaworski, Taylor and Bart J. Wilson. 2013. “Go West Young Man: Self‐selection and Endogenous
Property Rights,” Southern Economic Journal 79: 886‐904.
Kimbrough, Erik O., Vernon L. Smith, and Bart J. Wilson. 2010. “Exchange, Theft, and the Social
Formation of Property,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 74: 206‐229.
Kimbrough, Erik O. 2011. “Learning to Respect Property by Refashioning Theft into Trade,”
Experimental Economics 14(1): 84‐109.
Kimbrough, Erik O. and Bart J. Wilson. 2013. “Insiders, Outsiders, and the Adaptability of
Informal Rules to Ecological Shocks,” Ecological Economics 90: 29‐40.

23

Mackeldey, Ferdinand. 1883. Handbook of the Roman Law. Translated and edited by M.A.
Dropsie. Philadelphia: T.&J. W. Johnson & Co.
Merrill, Thomas W. and Henry E. Smith. 2007. “The Morality of Property,” William and Mary
Law Review 48: 1849‐1887.
Penner, James E. 1997. The Idea of Property in Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rose, Carol. 1985. “Possession as the Origin of Property,” University of Chicago Law Review 53:
711‐787.
Salmond, John W. 1907. Jurisprudence, Or, The Theory of Law. 2nd Edition. London: Stevens and
Haynes.
Schmidtz,
David.
2012.
“The
Institution
of
Property,”
Available
here:
http://www.davidschmidtz.com/sites/default/files/articles/InstitutionProperty2012.pdf.
Revised from “The Institution of Property,” Social Philosophy & Policy 11(1994): 42‐62.
Smith, Adam. 1759. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1982.
Smith, Adam C., David B. Skarbek, and Bart J. Wilson. 2012. “Anarchy, Groups, and Conflict: An
Experiment on the Emergence of Protective Associations,” Social Choice and Welfare,
38(2): 325‐353.
Smith, Charles John. 1894. Synonyms Discriminated: A Dictionary of Synonymous words in the
English Language. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Smith, Henry E. 2012. “Property as the Law of Things,” Harvard Law Review 125: 1691‐1726.
Symposium. 2011. “Property: A Bundle of Rights?” Econ Journal Watch 8(3): 193‐291.
Wierzbicka, Anna. 2006. English: Meaning and Culture. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wierzbicka, Anna. 2010. Experience, Evidence, and Sense: The Hidden Cultural Legacy of English.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, Bart J., Taylor Jaworski, Karl Schurter, and Andrew Smyth. 2012. “The Ecological and Civil
Mainsprings of Property: An Experimental Economic History of Whalers’ Rules of
Capture,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 28(4): 617‐656.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe.
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. New York: Harper & Row.

24

Figure 1. Screenshot of the homestead platform
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Figure 2. Screenshot of open sea platform

